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DEVIATION THEN AND NOW-WHEN
COGSA'S PER PACKAGE LIMITATION IS
LOST
MARGARET M. LENNONt
INTRODUCTION
At common law, deviation referred to a "'voluntary
departure, without necessary or reasonable cause, from the
regular and usual course' of a voyage."' The doctrine derived
partly from the carrier's duty to exercise his best efforts to safely
transport the goods 2 and the "understanding between the
shipper and carrier that the carrier would not stray from the
customary course of the voyage it contracted to undertake."3
Deviation from a contracted voyage deprived the carrier of many
of its defenses to liability, in effect making the carrier the
t J.D. Candidate, June 2003, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., May
1997, University of Notre Dame.
1 Hostetter v. Park, 137 U.S. 30, 40 (1890).
2
[When the carrier] receives the goods, it is his duty to take all possible care
of them in their passage, make due transport and safe and right delivery of
them at the place and time agreed upon; .... After having set sail, he
must proceed on the voyage, in the direct, shortest, and usual route, to the
port of delivery, without unnecessary deviation, unless there has been an
express contract as to the course to be pursued; and where the vessel is
destined for several ports and places, the master should proceed to them in
the order in which they are usually visited, or that designed by the
contract ....
C.A. Articulos Nacionales de Goma Gomaven v. MV Aragua, 756 F.2d 1156, 1158
(5th Cir. 1985) (quoting The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. 7, 24 (1858)).
3 Vision Air Flight Serv., Inc. v. M/V Natl Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir.
1998) (citing The Wildomino v. Citro Chem. Co. of Ain, 272 U.S. 718, 727 (1927) &
The Sarnia, 278 F. 459, 464 (2nd Cir. 1921)).
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insurer of the goods it was carrying.4 Courts developed this rule
because the shipper's insurance on its cargo was often voided
when a carrier inexcusably deviated from its contract of
carriage. 5
The doctrine of deviation has evolved considerably from its
origins, both in rationale and scope. This Note will discuss this
evolution in the wake of the enactment of The Carriage of Good
by Sea Act ("COGSA"), the differing approaches taken by the
circuits under COGSA, and the doctrine's vitality going forward,
which, as this Note will argue, is important, but not ensured.
I. EXPANSION OF THE DEVIATION DOCTRINE: A SUMMARY
Courts did not want to impose upon shippers risks they had
not bargained for, so "[t]he sort of activity that triggered
invocation of the deviation doctrine... was determined largely
by the extent, scope, and nature of the risk it imposed on the
cargo."6 Although originally limited to geographic deviations
from the contractually established route,7 American courts later
4 See generally Steven F. Friedell, The Deviating Ship, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1535
(1981). When the carrier breached the contract of carriage by deviating from the
agreed upon voyage, it was considered to have exposed the cargo to such additional
and unanticipated risk as to amount to a fundamental breach of the contract. As a
result, the carrier was not allowed to rely on exculpatory provisions in the bill of
lading, such as limitations on liability. See M/V Nat'l Pride, 155 F.3d at 1171 (citing
The Sarnia, 278 F. at 463-64 & Switz. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Navigazione Libera
Triestina, S.A., 91 F.2d 960, 962 (2d Cir. 1937)); see also The St. Johns N.F., 280 F.
553, 556-57 (2d Cir. 1922), affd, 263 U.S. 119 (1923); Globe Navigation Co. v. Russ
Lumber & Mill Co., 167 F. 228, 230-31 (N.D. Cal. 1908).
5 See, e.g., Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, Ltd., v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.,
741 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Friedell, supra note 4, at 1535 ("If
a boat captain violated the itinerary to which it was committed and thereby brought
about [a] loss.., he shall measure out to its owner. ... "). A marine insurer was
deemed to have assumed only those risks inherent in the contemplated voyage. "If
[a] carrier [deviated] ... then the insurance contract was 'ousted' and the insurers
relieved of their obligations with respect to any loss which might occur thereafer."
Agfa-Gevaert, Inc. v. S/S "TFL Adams," 596 F. Supp. 338, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(citing Hearne v. Marine Ins. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 488 (1874) & Oliver v. Md. Ins.
Co., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 487 (1813)). "A vessel making a geographic deviation was
considered to be on an entirely different voyage from the one originally
contemplated. Since the underwriter did not undertake to insure the cargo on that
different voyage, any insurance contract procured by the shipper was annulled."
M/VAragua, 756 F.2d at 1158 (citing Hearne v. Marine Ins. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
488 (1874)); see also GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §
2-6, 66 (2d ed. 1975).
6 M/VNat'l Pride, 155 F.3d at 1172.
7 Id.
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broadened the concept of unreasonable deviation to cover other
breaches of the contract of carriage deemed serious enough to
warrant the harsh consequences imposed by deviation.8
These other breaches became known as "quasi-deviations,"9
the most common example being the unjustifiable stowage of
cargo on deck.10 Quasi-deviations also included overcarriage
8 See MICHAEL F. STURLEY, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 123, 12-12 (2002) ("In
the United States... the deviation doctrine has grown beyond the geographic
context.. . ."). The Second Circuit has noted:
[Deviation] was originally employed, no doubt, for the purpose its
lexicographical definition implies, namely, to express the wandering or
straying of a vessel from the customary course of voyage; but it seems now
to comprehend in general every conduct of a ship or other vehicle used in
commerce tending to vary or increase the risk incident to a shipment.
The Sarnia, 278 F. at 464 (holding that the placement of a vessel in dry dock with
cargo aboard was a deviation (quoting The Indrapura, 171 F. 929, 931 (D. Or.
1909))). The Third Circuit offered perhaps an even broader (and certainly longer)
definition:
As applied in admiralty law, the term "deviation" was originally and
generally employed to express the wandering or straying of a vessel from
the customary course of the voyage, but in the course of time it has come to
mean any variation in the conduct of a ship in the carriage of goods
whereby the risk incident to the shipment will be increased, such as
carrying the cargo on the deck of the ship contrary to custom and without
the consent of the shipper, delay in carrying the goods, failure to deliver
the goods at the port named in the bill of lading and carrying them farther
to another port, or bringing them back to the port of original shipment and
reshipping them. Such conduct has been held to be a departure from the
course of agreed transit and to constitute a "deviation" whereby the goods
have been subjected to greater risks, and, when lost or damaged in
consequence thereof, clauses of exceptions in bills of lading limiting
liability cease to apply.
G.W. Sheldon & Co. v. Hamburg Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft, 28
F.2d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 1928).
9 See STURLEY, supra note 8, § 123, 12-6.
10 The Supreme Court applied the deviation doctrine to the unauthorized
stowage of cargo on deck in St. Johns N.F. Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral
Commercial Do Rio De Janeiro, 263 U.S. 119 (1923). In that case, the bill of lading
for the shipment did not expressly state that the goods would be stowed below deck
and a prior freight agreement entered into before the bill of lading was issued
permitted shipment of the goods "on or under deck, ship's option." Id. Nonetheless,
the Court said that issuance "[of a] clean bill of lading amounted to a positive
representation by [the ship] that.., the goods would go under deck." Id. at 124. The
court held:
By stowing the goods on deck the vessel broke her contract, exposed them
to greater risk than had been agreed and thereby directly caused the loss.
She accordingly became liable as for a deviation, [and] cannot escape
[liability] by reason of the relieving clauses inserted in the bill of lading for
her benefit ....
Id. The Court also recognized that if there were a port custom permitting on-deck
20021
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(carrying the goods beyond their intended destination port),1'
reshipment (taking goods to the port of destination, back to the
port of shipment, then sending them back to the destination
port),12 discharge of goods at the wrong port,13 and shipment or
transshipment of the goods on a different vessel from that
named in the bill of lading.14 Non-delivery or delivery to the
wrong person (or another variation of misdelivery), however, is
not a deviation. 15 Similarly, an unexplained disappearance of
goods does not create a presumption of deviation; in order to
invoke the doctrine, the shipper must prove a carrier's
affirmative wrongdoing, beyond mere negligent non-delivery. 16
stowage, there would be no deviation. More recently, courts have held that putting
containerized cargo on the deck of a specially conducted container ship pursuant to
a port or trade custom does not constitute deviation. See Konica Bus. Machs. v.
Vessel "Sea-Land Consumer", 47 F.3d 314, 315 (9th Cir. 1995).
11 See, e.g., Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt G.m.b.H., 313 F.2d 872,
873-74 (7th Cir. 1963) (finding deviation where the shipper delivered goods one and
a half years after the agreed upon time); Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v.
Dampkiesaktieselskabet Balto, 282 F. 235, 237 (2d. Cir. 1922) ("The failure to
deliver the goods at the port named in the bill of lading, and carrying them further
to another port, is an overcarriage, and constitutes a deviation.... ."); Hoskyn & Co.
v. Silver Line, Ltd., 63 F. Supp. 452, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (same), af/d, 143 F.2d 462
(2d. Cir. 1944).
12 See, e.g., Calderon v. Atlas Steamship Co., 64 F. 874, 877-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1894)
(imposing liability for carrying goods beyond port), affd, 69 F. 574 (2d. Cir. 1895),
rev'd on other grounds, 170 U.S. 272 (1898).
13 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Mar. S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 338-39
(2d Cir. 1986) (noting that the deposit of goods at an unscheduled port is a
deviation).
14 See, e.g., Smith, Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Colombian S.S. Co., 88 F.2d 392, 394-
95 (5th Cir. 1937) ("[Transhipment or forwarding by another carrier might be a
deviation.").
15 See Unimac Co. v. C.F. Ocean Serv., Inc., 43 F.3d 1434, 1437-38 (11th Cir.
1995) ("[We have held that a non-delivery is not a deviation."); B.M.A. Indus., Ltd.
v. Nigerian Star Line, Ltd., 786 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (holding that
misdelivery does not constitute a deviation); C.A. Articulos Nacionales de Goma
Gomaven v. MV Aragua, 756 F.2d 1156, 1160 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining that non-
delivery was neither a deliberate act nor an unanticipated risk, and, therefore, did
not seem to be in the class of conduct that historically constituted a deviation).
16 See C.A. Articulos Nacionales, 756 F.2d at 1159-61 (declining to impose
presumption of liability); C.A. La Seguridad v. Delta S.S. Lines, 721 F.2d 322, 324-
25 (11th Cir. 1983) (mere non-delivery does not prove deviation); G.W. Sheldon &
Co. v. Hamburg Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft, 28 F.2d 249, 252
(3d Cir. 1928) (requiring plaintiff to prove misfeasance in order to abrogate
contractual provisions limiting liability). See generally Brien D. Ward, Note,
Admiralty-Failure to Deliver Cargo Does Not Constitute Unreasonable Deviation
Under COGSA, 60 TUL. L. REv. 849 (1986).
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II. DEVIATION UNDER COGSA
A. COGSA's Origin and the per Package Limitation
Congress partially codified the general maritime law of
deviation in 1936 when it enacted COGSA. 17 COGSA was itself
an implementation of the Hague Rules.'8 COGSA was also
enacted to carry over into the international sphere the uniform
liability rules governing domestic voyages found in the Harter
Act,' 9 which mitigated the common law liability of carriers as
insurers. 20 To that end, section 4(5) of COGSA provides that
neither the carrier nor the ship will be liable for any loss or
damage to goods exceeding $500 per package, unless the nature
and value of the goods have been declared by the shipper and
recorded in the bill of lading.21  COGSA's only provision on
deviation provides:
Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at
sea, or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be an
infringement or breach of this chapter or of the contract of
carriage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or
damage resulting therefrom: Provided, however, That if the
deviation is for the purpose of loading or unloading cargo or
passengers it shall, prima facie, be regarded as unreasonable. 22
Unfortunately, COGSA does not define the term
"unreasonable deviation," and it does not clarify its relationship
to the $500 per package limitation on carrier liability either.23
17 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1982).
18 The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233. The Hague Rules, which constitute an
international maritime agreement, and COGSA are not identical because Congress
added language to the Hague Rules when it enacted COGSA. See GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 5, § 3-24, 143-44 (arguing that other than "minor differences
[COGSA] follows verbatim the Hague rules").
19 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1982).
20 See Sedco, Inc. v. S.S. Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1986).
21 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1982); see also Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach.
Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 298-99, 299 n.1 (1959) (discussing limitation of liability and the
statute).
22 46 U.S.C. § 1304(4) (1982). Congress added the last part of this section when
it adopted the Hague Rules. "The intention was to provide that a deviation solely to
increase the profit of the carrier would not be considered a reasonable deviation,
even if the deviation were 'reasonable' as far as the carrier was concerned." SNC
S.L.B. v. M/V Newark Bay, 111 F.3d 243, 248 n.11 (2d Cir. 1997).
23 Survival of the deviation doctrine "seemed uncertain for a while after the
enactment of COGSA .... [as it] does not explicitly state the consequences, if any, of
2002] 441
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Thus, in the very first case decided under COGSA, Judge
Weinfeld refused to read the statute as eliminating a principle
"so firmly entrenched in maritime law" without a clear
expression of congressional intent to do so in either the language
of the statute or in its scant legislative history.24 The court held,
and the majority of courts have followed its lead,25 that the $500
limitation does not apply in the event of an unreasonable
deviation, because it "so change[s] the essence of the agreement
as to effect its abrogation."26
B. Liberty Clauses and Reasonableness
COGSA allows only reasonable deviations from the
contracted voyage, regardless of the parties' agreement in the
bill of lading.27  This has led courts to nullify contractual
provisions allowing for deviation when the actual deviations
were unreasonable. 28 Such contractual provisions, commonly
an unreasonable deviation on the statute's $500 limitation of carrier liability." MI V
Newark Bay, 111 F.3d at 248.
24 Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The court
reasoned that without an exception to COGSA's liability limitation, a carrier would
be free to "reckless[ly] ... violate the terms of [a] bill of lading, knowing that it
cannot be called upon to pay more than $500 per package." Id. at 390.
25 See C.A. La Seguridad v. Delta S.S. Lines, 721 F.2d 322, 324 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that unreasonable deviation nullifies COGSA's limitation of liability); Gen.
Elec. Co. Int'l Sales Div. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1983)
[hereinafter S.S. Nancy Lykes III ("[Slection [4(4) of COGSA] clearly implies that
any unreasonable deviation is to be treated as a breach of COGSA and the contract
of carriage."); Nemeth v. Gen. S.S. Corp., 694 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding
that the unreasonable deviation rule survived enactment of COGSA); Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. H.I Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 18 (2d Cir. 1969) (adopting the
holding of The Flying Clipper without elaboration); Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1966) (declaring insurer
liability for deviations remains under COGSA). But see Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Poseidon Schiffahrt, G.m.b.H., 313 F.2d 872, 874 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding that an
unreasonable deviation does not deprive carrier of the $500 per package limitation).
26 The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. at 390. "Such a drastic change in the
existing law ... would have been expressed in clear and unmistakable terms." Id. at
389.
27 See Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M.V. Hakusan II, 954 F.2d 874, 883 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1992) (stating that "even prior to enactment of COGSA, this court recognized
that deviation from a voyage must be reasonable"); see also Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.
United States, 512 F.2d 1196, 1206 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that COGSA distinguishes
between reasonable and unreasonable deviations). But see Gen. Elec. Co. v. S.S.
Nancy Lykes, 536 F. Supp. 687, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) [hereinafter S.S. Nancy Lykes
I] (stating that any deviation is to be treated as a breach of the carriage agreement).
28 COGSA generally provides that provisions designed to escape liability are
not enforceable:
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referred to as "liberty clauses," are attempts by carriers to
protect themselves from the serious consequences of deviation.29
These clauses typically permit carriers to travel by any route
they see fit so that a deviation from the established route will
not constitute a breach of the contract.30 Utilized long before the
enactment of COGSA, liberty clauses were often drawn so
broadly that, if taken literally, there could be no application of
the deviation doctrine at all, because almost anything was
allowable under the contract. 31  Liberty clauses have been
interpreted, however, to authorize only reasonable or necessary
voyages, having "due regard to the rights of both the shipper and
the carrier."32
Now that COGSA statutorily permits reasonable deviations,
liberty clauses may seem less valuable than they once were,33
but they are still useful because a reasonable interpretation of
the clause will help determine what a reasonable deviation is in
a particular case.34 In Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. United States,3 5 the
Second Circuit rejected a liberty clause that allowed the carrier
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the
carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with
the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and
obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise
than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1982); see also Berkshire Fashions, Inc., 954 F.2d at 885
(finding that "[a] liberties clause that allows for any deviation imaginable allows for
unreasonable deviations and, consistent with COGSA and the decisions of other
courts in cases assessing liability, would be unenforceable"); S.S. Nancy Lykes I, 536
F. Supp. at 693 (stating that a carrier may not word a contract so as to make a
finding of deviation impossible).
29 See Yang Mach. Tool Co. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 58 F.3d 1350, 1353 & n.3
(9th Cir. 1995); Hellenic Lines, 512 F.2d at 1203 n.12, 1206 n.16.
30 See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Toyo Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 7 F.2d 889, 892
(N.D. Cal. 1925) (finding that the liberty clause controlled even when the carrier
took a route that was far from direct), aff'd, 12 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1926).
31 See Yang Mach. Tool Co., 58 F.3d at 1353; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, §
3-40, 178 ("It would seem hard to 'deviate' from such a voyage" where there is a
broad liberties clause).
32 STURLEY, supra note 8, § 125, 12-28; see also The San Giuseppe, 122 F.2d
579, 582-83 (4th Cir. 1941) (dictating that a broad liberty clause should not be
interpreted to allow serious departures from the general course); Swift & Co. v.
Furness, Withy & Co., 87 F. 345, 348 (D. Mass. 1898) (noting that a liberty clause
allows for only reasonable departures).
33 A liberty clause will not give a carrier "any deviation rights beyond those
allowed by § 4(4) of COGSA." S.S. Nancy Lykes 11, 706 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1983).
34 STURLEY, supra note 8, § 125, 12-28.
35 512 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1975).
2002]
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to deliver its cargo to any port it deemed safe, making the
shipper accept the cargo there, at the shipper's own risk and
expense. The court said that the liberty clause "must be con-
strued in light of the carrier's basic [statutory] duty, § [13013(2),
to 'properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care
for, and discharge the goods carried' in line with the agreement
of the parties."36 The Third Circuit relied on this rationale in
Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M.V. Hakusan II7 when it too
concluded that a liberty clause allowing for unreasonable
deviation was unenforceable under COGSA, which permits
deviation only to the extent that it is reasonable. 38
Although section 4(4) of COGSA creates the presumption of
unreasonableness with regard to deviation, courts have not
formulated a clear definition of what constitutes a "reasonable
deviation," resulting in ambiguity as to the standard for
rebutting COGSA's presumption. Many courts have looked to
the surrounding circumstances in order to determine
reasonableness. 39 Other courts have decided that any deviation
undertaken solely for the economic self-interest of the carrier is
unreasonable. 40  Several U.S. courts41 have applied a test
36 Id. at 1206.
37 954 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1992).
38 Id. at 883, 885; see also 46 U.S.C. § 1304(4) (1982) ("[A]ny reasonable
deviation shall not be deemed to be an infringement or breach of this chapter or of
the contract of carriage."); S.S. Nancy Lykes I, 536 F. Supp. 687, 692 (S.D.N.Y.
1982). On appeal in S.S. Nancy Lykes II, the Second Circuit, using the same
reasoning employed by both Hellenic and Berkshire, also cited legislative history,
which indicated that a policy consideration behind the enactment of COGSA was to
prevent carriers (who traditionally held a better bargaining position than shippers)
from setting "their own standards of proper carriage" by inserting broad liberty
clauses into bills of lading. S.S. Nancy Lykes 11, 706 F.2d at 84 (citing H.R. REP. No.
74-2218 (1936)).
39 In S.S. Nancy Lykes 11, 706 F.2d at 85-86, the Court held that the
reasonableness of a deviation will "depend[] on an assessment of all the surrounding
circumstances" and that "a deviation is unreasonable... when, in the absence of
significant countervailing factors, the deviation substantially increases the exposure
of cargo to foreseeable dangers that would have been avoided had no deviation
occurred." In that case, the Nancy Lykes took a more dangerous route for the sole
purpose of obtaining cheaper fuel bunkers, and was ultimately deemed to have
made an unreasonable deviation. Id. at 82-84.
40 See Sedco, Inc. v. S.S. Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1986); see also
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, § 3-40, 179. The authors explain the provision's
rationale:
[It] seems to be that the carrier ought not to be allowed to deviate with no
other motive than the increase of his own revenues; thus, the proof
required to overcome the prima facie unreasonableness of such a deviation
[Vol.76:437
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formulated in an older House of Lords decision 42 that applied the
British COGSA.43  The House of Lords considered several
definitions, but finally concluded:
The true test seems to be what departure from the contract
voyage might a prudent person controlling the voyage at the
time make and maintain, having in mind all the relevant
circumstances existing at the time, including the terms of the
contract and the interests of all parties concerned, but without
obligation to consider the interests of any one as conclusive.44
For the purposes of deviations under the U.S. COGSA,
"reasonableness" currently remains up to the discretion of the
courts, in light of the unique facts and circumstances of a
particular case. Discretion in this area is a good thing. In light
of the advent of containerization and other advances in
applicable technology, what may be unreasonable aboard one
carrier will hot, and should not, be considered unreasonable
aboard another. 45
C. Causation
Before COGSA, when an unreasonable, but voluntary,
deviation occurred, no showing of causation was required
because the deviation "'displaced' the bill of lading."46 COGSA,
however, suggests that a causal relationship between the
deviation and subsequent damage to cargo is now required to
would have to show something more than mere reasonableness from the
point of view of the carrier.
Id.
41 See Parnass Int'l Trade & Oil Corp. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 153,
156-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Greenstone Shipping Co. v. Transworld Oil, Ltd., 588 F.
Supp. 574, 588 (D. Del. 1984); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Booth S.S. Co., 99 F. Supp. 232,
237 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), affd per curiam sub nom. Feuer v. Booth S.S. Co., 195 F.2d 529
(2d Cir. 1952).
42 Stag Line, Ltd. v. Foscolo, Mango & Co. [1932] A.C. 328 (1931).
43 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22 (U.K), superseded
by Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1971, c. 19 (U.K.). The 1924 British COGSA is
substantially the same as the U.S. COGSA. Section 4(4) does not appear, but the
section was widely considered to be one inserted for clarification purposes, rather
than as altering the meaning of the Hague Rules. See STURLEY, supra note 8, §
124, 12-23.
4 Stag Line, Ltd., [1932] A.C. at 343-44.
45 See Du Pont de Nemours Int'l v. S.S. Mormacvega, 493 F.2d 97, 99-100 (2d
Cir. 1974).
46 Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. United States, 512 F.2d 1196, 1209 (2d Cir. 1975); see
also The Malcolm Baxter, Jr., 277 U.S. 323, 331 (1928) (noting that if a deviation
was voluntary the shipper cannot claim the benefit of the bill of lading clause).
20021
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displace the bill of lading.47 This issue has not yet been clearly
resolved by the courts.48 In fact, in a recent unpublished opinion,
the Second Circuit held that "causation is presumed if... the
deviation was unreasonable." 49 Elsewhere, the Second Circuit
has also suggested that "if lack of causal relation is to be allowed
as a defense[,] . .. a point we do not decide [here], the burden of
establishing this should be on the deviator."50  This issue
remains unclear, as there has not been much post-COGSA
authority that has addressed the apparent causation
requirement necessary to establish liability for a deviation. A
more fundamental question, however, is whether unreasonable
deviation doctrine has survived the enactment of COGSA in any
form.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Effect of COGSA's per Package Limitation on Deviation
Since COGSA's passage, U.S. courts have split over whether
deviation ousts the $500 per package limitation contained
therein, in effect abrogating the contract of carriage and making
the carrier an insurer. The Second Circuit has held that COGSA
was not intended to change the existing law and that
unreasonable deviation does deprive a carrier of the benefit of
COGSA's liability limitation.51 While the Fifth,52 Ninth,53 and
47 See 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (1982).
48 The Fifth Circuit post-COGSA case, Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.L duPont de
Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1966), held that insurer liability results from
an unreasonable deviation when the deviation is causally related to the resulting
damage. Some commentators have agreed with this interpretation and argued that
COGSA abolished the harsh doctrine that put the carrier in an "insurer's" position
after deviation and imposed liability for only that damage causally connected to the
deviation. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, § 3-41, 180. The "issue remains
open," due to a "surprising dearth of post-COGSA authority." Hellenic Lines, Ltd.,
512 F.2d at 1209 & n.26.
49 Nat'l Starch & Chem. Co. v. Project Asia Line, Inc., 00-9500, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14460, at *8 (2d Cir. June 27, 2001) (unpublished opinion) (citing Hellenic
Lines, Ltd., 512 F.2d at 1209).
50 Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 512 F.2d at 1209-10.
51 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
52 See Vistar, S.A. v. MIV Sea Land Express, 792 F.2d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that deviation ousts carrier's contractual defenses); C.A. Articulos
Nacionales de Goma Gomaven v. MIV Aragua, 756 F.2d 1156, 1158-59 (5th Cir.
1985) (holding that deviation deprives defendant of COGSA's package limitation);
Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833, 838 (5th Cir.
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Eleventh 54 Circuits have agreed with this interpretation, the
Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion when it held
that COGSA's language does change the effect of deviation,
whereby the package limitation applies regardless of any
unreasonable deviation.55
The Second Circuit maintains that COGSA should be read
in accordance with established principles of maritime law, such
that an unreasonable deviation undertaken by the carrier
abrogates any contractual or statutory liability exemption.56
This position is contained in section 4(4) of COGSA, which states
that any reasonable deviation by the carrier is not a "breach of
this Act or of the contract of carriage."57  Logically, an
unreasonable deviation would produce the opposite result; it
would entail a breach of both COGSA and the contract of
carriage. 58 COGSA does not expressly address the effect that a
breach of its provisions or of the contract of carriage will have
upon the per package liability limitation. The Seventh Circuit
argues that there is clear congressional intent to modify the
1966) (holding that deviation ousts the contract of carriage and COGSA's package
limitation).
53 See, e.g., Nemeth v. Gen. S.S. Corp., 694 F.2d 609, 612-13 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that COGSA did not alter pre-COGSA law).
5 The Eleventh Circuit has said in dicta that an unreasonable deviation
breaches the contract of carriage and nullifies COGSA's $500 per package
limitation. See C.A. La Seguridad v. Delta S.S. Lines, 721 F.2d 322, 324 (11th Cir.
1983) (citing Spartus Corp. v. S.S. Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1979)).
55 Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt, G.m.b.H., 313 F.2d 872, 874-75 (7th
Cir. 1963).
56 See S.S. Nancy Lykes 11, 706 F.2d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 1983).
57 46 U.S.C. § 1304(4) (1982). Section 4(4) "seems to assume that the
unreasonable deviation rule survives... [because it] implies that an unreasonable
deviation is a breach by the carrier of COGSA, thereby depriving the carrier of
COGSA's protection." Nemeth, 694 F.2d at 613.
58 Donna F. Grandy, Note, Unreasonable Deviations and the Applicability of
COGSA's limitation of Liability Provision: The Circuit Split-General Electric
Company International Sales Division. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 9 MAR. LAW. 114, 120
(1984). As the language of section 4(4) "is pregnant with the positive meaning that
an unreasonable deviation is 'an infringement and breach of this act,' it seems
logical... that when a departure from the contractual voyage is an unreasonable
deviation, the carrier is not entitled to any of the exemptions or limitations provided
by that Act." Nemeth, 694 F.2d at 613 (quoting 2A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 128,
12-32 (7th ed. 1981)). "The obvious corollary implied by Section 4(4) is that an
unreasonable deviation does violate the act and the contract of carriage, and that
the carrier is liable, at least to some extent, for loss or damage resulting from an
unreasonable deviation." STURLEY, supra note 8, § 128, 12-34.
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traditional rule.5 9 It interprets the placement of the limitation of
liability provision immediately after the deviation section,
coupled with the wording "neither the carrier nor the ship shall
in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage," to mean
that the $500 per package limitation applies to any loss or
damage, regardless of the cause.60 Advocates of the Second
Circuit's position reject the literal interpretation of "in any
event" and argue instead that liability limitations are forfeited
when there is an unreasonable deviation, offering "a comparison
between COGSA and earlier statutes dealing with carrier
liability as proof that COGSA's silence on this issue indicates an
adherence to the traditional view [of deviation].61
The Seventh Circuit seems to ignore the original purpose of
the deviation doctrine in its interpretation of COGSA. Deviation
subjects the cargo to risks that the shipper did not anticipate
and should, therefore, deprive the carrier of the protection of any
liability limitations. As the Fourth Circuit stated in Nemeth v.
General Steamship Corp.,62 "There is nothing in COGSA to
indicate that shippers should anticipate the additional risks
associated with unreasonable deviations."6 3 That court also
59 See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 313 F.2d at 875. One proponent of the Seventh
Circuit's approach also urges that the majority of American courts have improperly
interpreted COGSA by failing to acknowledge the international framers' intent and
the need for worldwide uniform standards in shipping. See J. Hoke Peacock III,
Note, Deviation and the Package Limitation in the Hague Rules and the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act: An Alternative Approach to the Interpretation of International
Uniform Acts, 68 TEX. L. REV. 977, 980. (1990). The author makes the less than
compelling argument that American courts, by looking to American pre-COGSA
case law to oust the per package limitation in the case of an unreasonable deviation,
"undermine the goal of international uniformity and fail to do their part to fulfill the
promise of COGSA and the Hague Rules." Id. at 980.
60 Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 313 F.2d at 874; see also Katherine A. Woodward, The
Liberty to Deviate: Yang Machine Tool Co. v. Sealand Service, Inc., 20 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 201, 208 (1995). "The reasoning of the courts which have taken this view is
that such statute provides unequivocally that the limitation of liability authorized
thereunder is valid 'in any event....'" Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. v. Marine
Transp., Inc., 900 F.2d 714, 720 (4th Cir. 1990).
61 Grandy, supra note 58, at 121. "Both the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196
(1982), and the Limited Liability Statute, 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-189 (1982), have been
interpreted to provide that unreasonable deviations eliminate any liability
exemption the carrier previously enjoyed." Id. at 121 n.51.
62 694 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1982).
63 Id. at 613. The court went on:
Indeed, in deciding whether to be bound by the liability limitation in
COGSA Section 4(5) or pay for such higher liability, a shipper is entitled to
assume that his goods will not be subjected to additional risks. The
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questioned the Seventh Circuit's rationale because treating the
liability limitation as absolute would allow a carrier to violate
the terms of the bill of lading at will. 64 For this reason, this Note
agrees with the majority of the circuits that have held that
deviation has survived the enactment of COGSA, adopting the
reasoning first articulated by the Second Circuit in The Flying
Clipper.65
B. Fair Opportunity
COGSA's per package limitation may not become effective
unless the shipper is afforded a "fair opportunity" by the carrier
to declare a higher than $500 liability rate by paying a greater
charge.66 Although there is agreement on this general principle,
there is disagreement as to what constitutes a fair opportunity to
declare a higher value.67 The Second Circuit has held that fair
opportunity requires that a shipper have notice of COGSA's
liability limitation and a fair opportunity to declare a higher
value for the cargo.68 A carrier seeking to enforce the $500
limitation must establish that notice was given to a shipper
through language contained in the bill of lading and that the
shipper was given the opportunity to opt out of that limitation.69
Once this is established, the burden shifts to the shipper to show
rationale behind the unreasonable deviation rule is sound and has not
been undermined by enactment of COGSA.
Id.
64 Id. "The carrier would be immunized even from the consequences of a
fundamental breach going to the essence of the contract. There is nothing in COGSA
or its history to warrant such a result." Id. (citing Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116
F. Supp. 386, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)). As a recent unpublished Second Circuit opinion
noted, "[T]o allow carriers to limit their liability when an unreasonable deviation
causes damage to cargo not only would weaken the carrier's primary duty of care to
cargo under § 3(2) of COGSA..., but would render meaningless the § 4(4)
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable deviations." Natl Starch &
Chem. Co. v. Atl. Mut. Cos., 00-9500, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 14460, at *57-58 (2d Cir.
June 27, 2001) (quoting S.S. Nancy Lykes 11, 706 F.2d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 1983)).
65 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
66 Laurence B. Alexander, Comment, Containerization, the Per Package
Limitation, and the Concept of "Fair Opportunity," 11 MAR. LAW. 123, 134 (1986).
67 See Chester D. Hooper, The Current State of Some Perpetually Litigated
Admiralty Cargo Issues, 18 FORUM 37, 44 (1982).
68 Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. M.V. Tourcoing, 167 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir.
1999); MacSteel Intl USA Corp. v. M/V IBN Abdoun, 154 F.2d 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
69 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. MV Nedlloyd, 817 F.2d 1022, 1024 (2d Cir. 1987).
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there was no fair opportunity. 70
Similarly, in the Ninth Circuit, "[i]f the bill of lading
contains an express, legible recitation of the $500 limitation, and
of the opportunity to declare a higher value, the bill of lading will
constitute prima facie evidence that the shipper was given the
requisite fair opportunity."71 The most recent Ninth Circuit
decisions, however, suggest that the requirement is less
stringent than earlier cases suggested.7 2 In the Fifth Circuit, "if
the carrier provides evidence that the shipper could have
declared a higher value,.., then the requirement is satisfied."73
Following the Fifth Circuit,74 the Eleventh Circuit has also held
that either a "clause paramount"75 in the bill of lading, or a valid
tariff filed with the Federal Maritime Commission that offers a
choice of rates, will constitute fair opportunity,76 making it clear
that a space on the bill of lading itself to make a value
declaration is not necessary.77 The Fourth Circuit has never
stated a rule establishing a minimum fair opportunity standard,
but has consistently concluded that the shipper did have fair
opportunity based on the specific facts of each case.78 Finally,
70 Id. at 1029. Only after establishing a prima facie showing of fair opportunity
may the defendant present evidence that plaintiff had cargo insurance and thus was
aware of COGSA's liability limitation. See MacSteel Int'l USA Corp., 154 F.2d at
832 (discussing in detail the fair opportunity doctrine as it currently stands in the
Second Circuit); see also Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 167 F.3d at 102.
71 Yang Mach. Tool Co. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 58 F.3d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir.
1995) (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vessel Sam Houston, 26 F.3d 895, 898 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
72 See, e.g., Vision Air Flight Serv., Inc. v. M/V Natl Pride, 155 F.3d 1165,
1168-69 (9th Cir. 1998); Yang Mach. Tool Co., 58 F.3d at 1354-55.
73 STURLEY, supra note 8, § 166, 16-29; see, e.g., Wuerttembergische v. M/V
Stuttgart Express, 711 F.2d 621, 622 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) ("[Tihe shipper
carries the burden of proving that an opportunity for choice.., did not in fact
exist.").
74 The Eleventh Circuit holds itself bound by decisions of the "old" Fifth
Circuit-decisions delivered prior to the division of the circuit into the Fifth and the
Eleventh on October 1, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209-
11 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
75 A clause paramount is a provision in the charter party contract that
incorporates the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act into the charter. M. McCary, Distant
Past or Future Trouble? Redefining Customary Trade Allowance in Maritime Oil
Shortage Claims, 20 REV. LITIG. 45, 76 (2000).
76 Unimac Co. v. C.F. Ocean Serv., Inc., 43 F.3d 1434, 1438 (11th Cir. 1995);
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. MV Ocean Lynx, 901 F.2d 934, 939 (11th Cir. 1990).
77 See Ins. Co. of N. Am., 901 F.2d at 941; Heri v. Fritz Cos., 841 F. Supp. 1188,
1192 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
78 See STURLEY, supra note 8, § 166, 16-30.
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the Sixth Circuit has held that a bill of lading that incorporates
the relevant language of section 4(5)79 is enough to constitute
fair opportunity to a shipper.80 All in all, it appears that most
circuits are moving away from an inquiry into a shipper's
opportunity to declare a higher value. That is, they seem to be
allowing any suggestion of an opportunity to declare a higher
value to suffice as "fair opportunity," perhaps reflecting the
current reality that most shippers are very experienced, are well
aware of liability limitations, and, more often than not, purchase
their own cargo insurance.
IV. CIRCUMSCRIBING DEVIATION
A. Quasi-Deviation Today
The notion of unreasonable deviation expanded even after
the enactment of COGSA. In Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v.
S.S. Hong Kong Producer,8l the Second Circuit held that
placement of metal containers on the deck of a ship constituted
an unreasonable deviation that ousted the carrier's defenses,
including the package limitation.8 2  The majority in
Encyclopaedia Britannica, however, carefully narrowed their
decision to include only ships not specially suited for carrying
containers on deck.83 Soon thereafter, a district court within the
Second Circuit held that it was not an unreasonable deviation to
carry container cargo on the deck of a container ship specifically
built, designed, and constructed to do so.8 4 Carrying cargo on the
79 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
8D See Acwoo Intl - Steel Corp. v. Toko Kaiun Kaish, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1284, 1288-
89 (6th Cir. 1988).
81 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969).
82 Id.; cf Sedco, Inc. v. S.S. Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1986) (accepting
application of the quasi-deviation doctrine to unauthorized on-deck stowage,
although finding carrier's deviation reasonable under the particular facts).
83 See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 422 F.2d at 18 n.12.
84 See Dlu Pont de Nemours Intl S.A. v. S.S. Mormacvega, 367 F. Supp 793, 800
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding that deck stowage was
a reasonable deviation, because, among other facts, the containers stored on deck
were not subject to greater risks); see also English Elec. Valve Co. v. M/V Hoegh
Mallard, 814 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that stowage of an open top
container on the deck of a cargo ship was not a deviation but, if it had been, it would
have been reasonable, due to industry custom and the implicit consent of the
shipper); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Blue Star (N. Am.), Ltd., 1997 AMC 2434, 2452
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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deck of container ships is now generally accepted as
reasonable, 85 but the quasi-deviation doctrine still applies to
non-containerized cargo.8 6
Although shippers have tried to expand the doctrine even
further to include, amongst other things, instances of
negligence,87 criminal88 and willful misconduct,8 9 releasing cargo
to a person not holding the necessary documents,90 and failing to
provide a seaworthy vessel, 91 the Second Circuit has since
strictly curtailed its application to geographic deviations and the
unauthorized on-deck stowage of cargo.92
This trend began in Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. v. SS
John Weyerhaeuser,93 which found that the principle of quasi-
deviation is arguably inconsistent with COGSA and is "not one
85 See, e.g., Konica Bus. Machs. V. Vessel Sea-Land Consumer, 47 F.3d 314, 316
(9th Cir. 1995); cf ETS Gustave Brunet, S.A. v. M/V "Nedlloyd Rosario," 929 F.
Supp. 694, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Leather's Best Intl, Inc. v. MV "Lloyd Sergipe," 760
F. Supp. 301, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
86 See, e.g., Constructores Tecnicos, S. de R.L. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 945 F.2d
841, 849 (5th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing The Mormacmega because the damaged
cargo "was not in a container"); Seguros Banvenez, S.A. v. S/S Oliver Drescher, 761
F.2d 855, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1985).
87 See Sedco, Inc., 800 F.2d at 32; S.S. Nancy Lykes 11, 706 F.2d 80, 87 (2d Cir.
1983); see also Rockwell Intl Corp. v. M/V Incotrans Spirit, 998 F.2d 316, 318-19
(refusing to extend deviation doctrine to cover damage to cargo resulting from
negligence in off-loading); Alternative Glass Supplies v. M/V "Nomzi," 1999 AMC
1080, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
88 In B.M.A. Industries, Ltd. v. Nigerian Star Line, Ltd., 786 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.
1986), the court rejected the argument that misdelivery should be treated as a
deviation because of an alleged criminal receipt of bribes by the carrier, noting that
the Second Circuit "repeatedly has declined to extend the doctrine of deviation on
the basis of culpability or crime." Id. at 92.
89 "Wanton and willful misconduct" of a carrier in tendering an unseaworthy
ship does not constitute deviation, because probing the carrier's level of culpability
to determine possible deviation would create too much uncertainty. Iligan
Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. v. SS John Weyerhaeuser, 507 F.2d 68, 71-73 (2d Cir.
1974).
90 See Allied Chem. Intl Corp. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro,
775 F.2d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 1985).
91 See SS John Weyerhaeuser, 507 F.2d at 68.
92 See Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, Ltd. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 741 F. Supp.
1051, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Sedco, Inc., 800 F.2d at 31-32). In the Second
Circuit "the doctrine of deviation has been carefully limited, especially in the last
decade." Sedco, Inc., 800 F.2d at 32. "Quasi-deviation is a doctrine entrenched in the
law, but not, apparently, expanding in scope." SPM Corp. v. MV Ming Moon, 965
F.2d 1297, 1303 (3d Cir. 1992); see also B.M.A. Indus., Ltd., 786 F.2d at 91-92;
Italia Di Navigazione, S.p.A. v. M.V. Hermes I, 724 F.2d 21, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1983);
SS John Weyerhaeuser, 507 F.2d at 71-73.
93 507 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974).
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to be extended. 9 4 About a decade later, the Second Circuit's
decision in Sedco, Inc. v. S.S. Strathewe clearly limited deviation
to its original scope of geographic deviation and unauthorized on-
deck storage, 95 reiterating the view expressed by Gilmore &
Black in their admiralty treatise that "it would seem unwise to
extend analogically and by way of metaphor a doctrine of
doubtful justice under modern conditions, of questionable status
under COGSA, and of highly'penal effect. 9 6 Other circuits have
demonstrated similar hostility toward the doctrine, especially in
the context of quasi-deviation. 97
B. Insurance Concerns
The doctrine of deviation may be traced to the pre-COGSA
law of marine insurance, which held that insurers only accepted
the risks reasonably contemplated by the parties.98 Since a
carrier's unreasonable deviation voided the shipper's insurance,
courts forced the carrier to assume the liabilities of the insurer.99
Currently, however, deviation clauses 00 are commonly included
in modern cargo insurance contracts, 101 lending credibility to the
argument that the basis for the traditional rule is no longer
viable. In other words, since a shipper's insurance policy will
insulate the cargo from all deviations, carriers should be entitled
to the statutory liability limitation provided by COGSA. 10 2
Another commentator argues that the burden to fully insure
the goods is on the shipper, who can easily do so under section
94 Id. at 72.
95 800 F.2d 27, 31-32 (2d Cir. 1986).
96 GILBERT & BLACK, supra note 5, § 3-42, 183; see also Sedco, Inc., 800 F.2d at
31-32.
97 See Vision Air Flight Serv., Inc. v. M/V Nat'l Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th
Cir. 1998); Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Companhia de Navegacao Maritima
Netumar, 993 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir. 1993) (declining to "extend the 'unreasonable
deviation' doctrine beyond its current boundaries"); SPM Corp., 965 F.2d at 1304
("we agree with our sister circuits that the doctrine of quasi-deviation should not be
viewed expansively in the post-COGSA era.").
98 See Sedco, Inc., 800 F.2d at 31.
99 Id.
100 WILLIAM D. WINTER, MARINE INSURANCE 169 (3d ed. 1952) (noting that a
deviations clause "holds the assured covered in the event of deviation or change of
voyage").
101 LESLIE J. BUGLASS, MARINE INSURANCE AND GENERAL AVERAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES 40-41 (2d ed. 1981).
102 Grandy, supra note 58, at 121.
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4(5) of COGSA by paying a higher freight rate. 10 3 This will not
necessarily increase what the shipper must normally spend to
insure his goods-the gross cost will be the same whether the
shipper insures through an independent underwriter or the
carrier.10 4 It is not unduly burdensome "to require the shipper to
bear the cost of sufficient insurance ... [and this] is, in fact,
what the trade custom requires"; moreover, given the highly
punitive nature of deviation doctrine, "shifting the burden of
insuring the cargo onto the carrier would also be grossly
inequitable."10 5  These arguments in favor of limiting the
deviation doctrine suggest that the doctrine is outmoded because
modern insurance now covers all losses resulting from deviation.
C. Continuing Viability of Deviation Today
The arguments for curtailing deviation seem to ignore that,
historically, applying the deviation doctrine did not depend on
whether the goods were insured. 106 The Ninth Circuit, in Vision
Air Flight Service, Inc. v. M /V National Pride, explained, "[T]o
the extent the deviation doctrine is concerned with providing an
incentive for carriers not to undertake certain actions that
impose unreasonable risks on cargo, insurance is irrelevant." 10 7
The court suggested that Congress, when enacting COGSA,
deliberately failed to allocate every conceivable risk of
misconduct by carriers, knowing that some egregious and
unreasonable conduct would simply never be contemplated by
the parties. 08 COGSA was not intended to allow carriers to
grossly deviate from the contract of carriage without facing
increased liability. As the court in General Electric Company
International Sales Division v. S.S. Nancy Lykes'09 stated,
allowing carriers who unreasonably deviate to escape full
liability "not only would weaken the carrier's primary duty of
103 Brien D. Ward, Note, Admiralty-Failure to Deliver Cargo Does Not
Constitute Unreasonable Deviation Under COGSA, 60 TUL. L. REV. 849, 859 (1986).
104 See id.
105 Id. at 859, 860.
106 See Vision Air Flight Serv., Inc. v. M/V Nat'l Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1174 n.10
(9th Cir. 1998).
107 Id.
108 See id. at 1174 ("Congress ... may never have intended that extraordinarily
culpable misconduct fall within the terms of the compromise it struck between the
interests of shippers and carriers.").
109 706 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1983).
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care to cargo under § 3(2) of COGSA, but would render
meaningless the § 4(4) distinction between reasonable and
unreasonable deviations. " 110 Clearly, Congress meant to keep
deviation alive, or else it would not have distinguished between
reasonable and unreasonable. A district court within the Second
Circuit perhaps best summed up the problem with the current
limitations on the doctrine:
[Tihe law of this Circuit seems to have created an unjust
paradox: a carrier who stowes [sic] cargo on deck without the
shipper's authorization loses COGSA's per package limitation;
and yet, a carrier who recklessly tenders an unseaworthy ship
which consequently sinks with all its cargo and crew, gets the
benefit of the package limitation. In addition, a carrier who
misrepresents the onboard status of the cargo in its bill of
lading will lose COGSA's package limitation, regardless of
whether the misrepresentation was fraudulent; and yet, a
carrier who fraudulently misrepresents that its ship is
seaworthy can successfully benefit from the package
limitation.111
Although the insurance rationale behind the deviation
doctrine is less compelling than it once was, deviation is still
vital as an incentive to ensuring that carriers behave properly.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Note concludes that the
doctrine should not just be limited to geographic deviations and
unauthorized on-deck stowage of cargo, but it should also
encompass other egregious departures from the contemplated
voyage that cause damage to the cargo. Furthermore, because
Congress has never fully clarified what effect deviation was
intended to have on COGSA's per package limitation, there is no
compelling reason for courts to so drastically curtail such a long-
standing doctrine of Admiralty Law when the reasons
supporting it remain valid today.
110 Id. at 87 (citation omitted).
111 Mitsui Marine Fire & Ins. Co. v. Direct Container Line, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d
412, 415 n.31 (quoting In re Complaint of Tecomar S.A., 765 F. Supp. 1150, 1185
n.95 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
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